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STUDENT NoTEs
1803. (Sergeant East in Picas of the Crown). This misinterpretation
limited dying declarations to criminal prosecution for homicide. A
note by Chief Justice Redfield in his edition of Professor Greenleaf's
treatise, gave it its widest credit and led to its general acceptance.
t Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) §1432.
In 10 B. U. L. Rev. 470-87, the fundamental difference in the re-
ception of evidence in criminal and civil actions is given as the reason
for the distinction. It is unnecessary in civil actions because in a
pending action testimony of witnesses can be taken by deposition, and
In anticipated actions, the testimony may be perpetuated. This is not
true In criminal cases. If the exception were not made, slayers might
often go free because of the provision in the Federal Constitution se-
curing to the accused the right to be confronted with witnesses against
him.
While it is submitted that the admissibility of dying declarations
In civil as well as criminal actions is the only logical and consistent
rule, the fact remains that by the overwhelming weight of authority,
dying declarations are admitted as evidence -6nly in public prosecu-
tions for homicide involving legally the resulting death as a necessary
element.
ELEAxon DAwsoN.
PLFADINzG--PRBATVE FAcTs MAY NOT BE PL AuDi.-In an action
to recover on an insurance policy a demurrer to the plaintiffs petition
was sustained in the trial court. Plaintiff refused to plead further and
appealed the case, assigning the ruling on the demurrer as error. The
injury for which the plaintiff sought damages consisted of the loss of
sight of one eye. The policy read, "loss of eye or eyes shall mean the
irrecoverable loss of the entire sight thereof." In his petition the
plaintiff stated that he entirely and irrecoverably lost the practical
use and sight of his left eye. It was contended by the appellee that
this was a mere conclusion of the pleader, since no facts are alleged
showing to what extent the sight of his eye was impaired or diminished.
The court stated that it was sufficient to plead ultimate as dis-
tinguished from probative facts, and that if plaintiff had stated to
what extent he was able to discern objects or distinguish light from
darkness he would merely have pleaded evidentary facts tending to
establish the resultant or ultimate fact. Johnson v. Inter-Southern
Life Ins. Co., 244 Ky. 83, 50 S. W. (2d) 16 (1932).
Briefly, the subject under discussion in this paper is the state-
ment of facts in the pleading of either party, which sets forth his peti-
tion, answer, counterclaim, or any other pleading that might appear.
There are imaginary limits within which the pleader must place his
statement of facts. Hi must not, on the one hand, make his plead-
ings so elementary as to embrace evidentary matter, nor, on the
other, make them so general as to be only conclusions of law. The line
of demarcation between ultimate facts and evidentary matter will be
the only one dealt with here.
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Ky. Civil Code of Practice, Section 119, states, "Neither the evi-
dence relied on by a party nor presumptions of law . . . shall be stated
in a pleading." This is the abstract rule used in practically all of the
code states. Clark on Code Pleading, section 38, p. 150. The rule is
stated simply, but its application has probably been the most difficult
of all of the codifier's reforms. Under this rule the parties can never
be certain as to the sufficiency of their pleadings. If sufficient facts
are not stated by the pleading a demurrer will lie thereto, Ky. Code,
section 93 (1), and if the facts stated are too elementary a motion to
strike may be entertained, Ky. Code, section 121. Of course amend-
ments are freely allowed, Ky. Code, section 134, but are always at the
cost of the party whose pleading requires them. Ky. Code, sections
94 and 121. A better knowledge of this subject would enable the coun-
sel to save his client money, the court time and himself work.
The problem does not at first appear so difficult, but when we con-
sider it in the light of the conditions existing in a particular case we
understand better the difficulty with which we are confronted. The
pleader generally does not know his entire case until it comes to trial,
and even though he does, he does not want to disclose any more
of it than is absolutely necessary. On the other hand the opposing liti-
gant will want to tie him down to a particular issue and be prepared
to attack everything in his opponent's case. If a test or standard
could be set to which the pleadings must conform the difficulty might
be largely obliterated, but the impracticability of such a test is readily
discernible. A brief review of some of the textbooks on code plead-
ing might afford some help, but will by no means settle the problem.
As to what facts must be pleaded the text-writers have various names.
Bliss, in his book on Code Pleading, third edition, section 206, p. 324,
calls them "issuable or ultimate facts,' and says, "A pleader may de-
termine by inquiring whether a denial of such a fact would make a
material issue--whether, if the denial be sustained, the defendant may
not still be liable." Phillips, Code Pleadings, section 347, p. 344, dis-
cusses the matter in this way: "That only the operative facts consti-
tuting the right of action or the defense shall be pleaded, and that
evidential facts shall not be alleged, is an elementary principle of
pleading; and its careful observation is indispensable to that brevity,
simplicity, and clearness aimed at by the new procedure. To take the
raw material of a transaction and separate the operative facts from
the probative matter is a process that requires much care and dis-
crimination." Pomeroy, Code Remedies, fifth edition, section 411,
p. 620 to 624, states that, "The material facts which constitute the
ground of relief, or the defense of new matter (confession and avoid-
ance), should be averred as they actually exist or took place, and not
the legal effect or aspect of those facts, and not the mere evidence or
probative matter by which their existence is established." Then Clark,
Code Pleading, section 38, p. 157, who probably has the most rational
as well as the most practical attitude toward the problem, and un-
doubtedly the most liberal, makes these statements; "Rarely should a
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pleading be condemned for being over-specific and the objection should
then be considered one of form merely-undue verbosity, repetition,
etc., rather than one of substance." "The matter should be one within
the fair discretion of the trial court in most cases. No rule of thumb
is possible . . ."
Although these eminent writers have proven most valuable on the
subject of pleading and in the interpretation of the code reforms, they
have not been able to assist a great deal in determining just what
amounts to ultimate facts and probative matter. An examination of
some of the cases shows that they are also of very little assistance.
Fuller v. Keesee et al., 31 Ky. L. R. 1099, 104 S. W. 700 (1907), was
a case in which an action was brought for the recovery of land granted
to the plaintiff's grantor by a patent containing some exceptions that
were not granted. The court held that plaintiff was not required to
allege that the land sued for was not within the dxceptions, and stated,
"He need not so aver because he is not required to plead his evidence."
In Turner v. Hamlin, 152 Ky. 469, 153 S. W. 778 (1913), the court said,
"Although a judgment is prima facie evidence of a fact it is not a
sufficient allegation of that fact in a pleading." Then in War Fork
Land Co. et al. v. Carr, 236 Ky. 453, 33 S. W. (2d> 308 (1930), the
court said, "Matters of evidence need not be pleaded, and, if pleaded,
failure to deny such matter constitutes no admission of the evi-
dentary facts." In this last case, granting that a failure to deny evi-
dentary matters constituted no admission thereof, it would be difficult
for the defendant and the court to always tell exactly what allegations
were material and what evidentary.
The cases from other jurisdictions are in accord with the principal
case and, although declarative of the rule in its concrete form, they do
not attempt to give a criterion by which other cases may be judged.
Texas Indemnity In. Co. v. Bridges, (Texas) 52 S. W. (2d) 1075
(1932), held that "Testimony need not be pleaded." In Weis v. West
et al., 256 N. Y. Supp. 571 (1932), the court held that a motion to
strike defenses that alleged only evidentary matter should be allowed.
In Mitchell Woodbury Corporation v. Albert Pick Barth Co. Inc. et al.,
41 (2d) 148 (1930), a case arising in Massachusetts, the court stated,
"The plaintiff Is not required in its declaration to set forth in detail
all the evidence on which it relies. It is sufficient unless objected to
for lack of particularity to allege his cause of action with substantial
certainty."
There are two views that may be taken on this subject. On the
one hand, there is the view of Pomeroy, that a strict line of demarca-
tion should be drawn and that only a certain type of facts should be
pleaded. On the other hand, there is the less conservative view of
Clark, that It is practically impossible for any criterion to be set to
which the pleadings must conform, that no substantial harm can be
done by liberality in the pleadings and that it should be largely dis-
cretionary with the trial court to decide these matters. The cases are
divided as to these views. In Johnson v. Johnson, (Mont.) 15 (2d) 842
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(1932), the court stated, "Good pleading neither requires nor permits
the pleading of evidence upon which the pleader relies to maintain his
action. Ultimate facts only should be set out. Ultimate facts are
nothing more than issuable, constitutive, or traversable facts essential
to the statement of the cause of action." A more liberal view Is taken
by the Iowa court in Dorman v. Credit Reference & Reporting ao. et
al., (Iowa) 241 N. W. 436 (1932). Although holding that a party can-
mot be required to set out evidence in his pleading, the court stated
that an appeal will not lie from a motion to strike.
The principal case illustrates the usual conflict as to this matter.
The defeidant there thought that the plaintiff should allege more spe-
cifically to what extent the sight of his eye had been impaired. Had
the plaintiff averred more specifically the defendant could have been
better prepared to meet the allegations with his evidence. It is clear
that the petition was sufficient to bring the case under the policy and
to give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's case against it. The
eminent judge was, therefore, correct in overruling the demurrer.
It is not often that the pleader makes his statements too ele-
mentary. The tendency is to the converse. But, in cases where evi-
dentary matter appears the remedy in this state is easily consum-
mated. The redundant matter may be stricken by a motion or by the
court on its own motion. Ky. Civil Code, section 121; City of Prince-
ton v. Baker et al., 237 Ky. 325, 35 S. W. (2d) 524 (1931). On the
other hand when a pleading is demurred to for not containing suffi-
cient facts and the demurrer is sustained, the pleader must either
elect to stand on his pleading or plead over. At least some of the
courts hold that if the pleader merely enters his exceptions and pleads
over he cannot then assign the ruling on the demurrer as error on ap-
peal. He must elect to stand on his pleading. Dorman v. Credit Ref-
erence & Reporting Co. et al., supra.
This matter should be left fairly up to the discretion of the trial
court. When we attempt to define "ultimate," "issuable," "travers-
able," or "constitutive" facts we encounter a task that is beyond our
human ability. Every case has different facts and conditions. The
best we can do is to lay down general rules. First, we should aim at
brevity, simplicity and clearness, guarding against undue verbosity
and repetition. Second, we should, with substantial certainty, give the
Opponent fair notice of the case or defense thereto.
JAs. T. HATOHE.
MINES .ND MiNRALs-DAxAGES FOR TRESPASS.-In the recent case
of Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 245 Ky. 256, 53 S. W.
(2d) 538 (1932), it was said of one who takes coal from land on which
he has no right to mine, that if he were a trespasser through Innocent
mistake and not guilty of an intentional taking, the measure of dam-
ages he would be liable to pay would be the value of the coal as It lay
In the ground or the reasonable and customary royalty, rather than
